Policies such as mandatory financial disclosure for private firms change how much investors know about the firms they fund, and whether that knowledge is public or private. This paper asks when more information about firms raises welfare in the context of equity financing. I develop a model in which investors choose how much capital to contribute to each firm in exchange for a share of its future profits, observing only a private and a public signal of its productivity. How an investor's contribution responds to the contributions of other investors is governed by two opposing forces. Larger contributions by other investors raise the profits that investors share, which pushes an investor to contribute more, but they also dilute its share of those profits, which pushes it to contribute less. The balance between these forces determines whether investors react to one another too much or too little. I show that more public information can lower welfare when investors react too much to what other investors are doing, and that more private information can lower welfare when they react too little. Finally, if a policymaker can decide only whether information is public or private, not how much there is, it is optimal to make all information public or all of it private, and I characterize when each is optimal.